Δύο πολύ σημαντικά κείμενα που πρέπει να διαβαστούν. Ένα βιβλίο για τις σχέσεις Ατατούρκ και Ναζιστών και το δεύτερο μια θλιβερή αλλά αναγκαία θύμηση των τουρκικών Χριστιανικών Γενοκτονιών, Αρμενίων, Ασσυρίων και Ελλήνων, που σε λίγες μέρες κλείνουν τα 100 χρόνια από τις εκτελέσεις τους. Ειδικά τις μαύρες μέρες που περνούμε εν έτη 2015, όπου ο Χριστιανισμός βρίσκεται και πάλιν υπό βάρβαρο διωγμό, βιασμούς,αποκεφαλισμούς, εκτελέσεις και γενική εξόντωση στη Μέση Ανατολή και Αφρική…

Φανούλα Αργυρού Λονδίνο.

http://www.aina.org/news/20150402153207.htm

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Remembering the Forgotten Genocide

https://barnabasaid.org

Posted 2015-04-02 19:32 GMT

(Image Source: Wikipedia, Semhur)In 1900 Christians constituted around 32% of Ottoman Turkey’s population. Just 27 years later the figure was down to about 1.8%.

In early 1915, a fatwa was issued against non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire. Muslims were called to fight the Christian minorities with whom they had been living as neighbours, albeit not on equal or necessarily peaceful terms. Many refused to take part, but those who did inflicted colossal suffering and destruction on the Armenian, Greek and Assyrian Christians.

It is thought that over 1.5 million Armenians, up to 750,000 Assyrians and up to 1.5 million Greeks — men, women and children — were killed in the state-sanctioned genocide over a 30-year period; yet their tragic loss is barely remembered today. The Armenians’ Golgotha and the Assyrians’ Seyfo (“sword”) is a forgotten genocide against forgotten peoples.

Background

As the Ottoman Empire began to crumble in the late 1800s, the Sultan introduced new reforms to try to prevent the Empire’s non-Muslim minorities from seceding; the reforms supposedly provided religious equality, thus appeasing religious minorities. However, the Turks lost lands in the Balkans after Russia intervened to protect Slavic Christians from Ottoman brutality in Europe in the 1877-78 Russo-Turkish war. This loss of territory led to a change in Ottoman tactics: violent suppression of the non-Muslim subjects they feared were wanting to secede.

Armenians, Assyrians and Greek Christians had been treated as second-class citizens for centuries, in accordance with Islamic sharia law, but they had also suffered, unprotected, from Turkish and Kurdish raids. As they began to campaign for their rights, Sultan Abdul Hamid II dealt with them “not by reform but by blood.”1

In 1894-1896 organised massacres against Christians took place, during which as many as 300,000 Armenians died. Many Christians believed their best chance of escaping Ottoman dominion was by appealing to “Christian” powers in the West and Russia. Bar sending warnings – which went unheeded – and some aid provided by Western Christian missionaries,
no help came.

By 1913, the Young Turks had come to power and begun adopting a new policy whereby the Ottoman Empire no longer accepted multiple ethnicities and religions; the militaristic leadership opted to force “Turkish”, subsequently Muslim, homogeneity on all its subjects.

The “Armenian Question”

The former Christian kingdom of Armenia had become part of the Ottoman Empire in the 16th century, located in its north-eastern corner. Armenian people were a significant minority and lived throughout the Empire, making them a perceived threat. In late 1914, extermination became the authorities’ extreme answer to the so-called “Armenian question”.

Though many Armenians fought for the Empire in the First World War, the government chose to systematically disarm and kill Armenian soldiers. Some were murdered in public squares or by using the Islamic method for slaughtering animals: tied-up, put on their backs and throats slit. On 24 April 1915 authorities arrested and later executed Armenian intellectuals and leaders.

Christians were freighted by train or forced to walk hundreds of miles without provisions to concentration camps in the Syrian Desert for “manual labour”. Only one quarter of all deportees survived the exposure, starvation, violent attacks and other abuses to reach their destinations, whereupon many were murdered in organised killings. Those who tried to protect Armenians often met the same end. Killing units in Deir al-Zor smashed children against rocks, mutilated adults with swords, and burned people alive. Some 200,000 Armenians converted to Islam in order to be spared. In 1915 alone, approximately 800,000 Armenians were killed.

The Assyrian Seyfo

Assyrians, a much smaller minority in the Ottoman Empire, comprising Assyrian, Syriac and Chaldean Christians, suffered the same experiences as the Armenians. In Van and Diyarbakir provinces, over 140,000 Assyrians were killed.

The attacks against the Assyrians began on a relatively small scale, but after the Assyrians had joined with the Russians in 1915 to try to help liberate the Armenians in Van, they were subjected to a level of violence that almost annihilated them. Many Assyrians fled to Persia (Iran) but were persecuted by both Persians and Kurds, obliging them to move again to Hamadan, northern Persia, in 1918; this retreat led to the deaths and kidnappings of one third of their people. Their road became littered with the bodies of those who were starved, exhausted, diseased, or slaughtered by Turks, Persians and Kurds en route.

We have lost by death and murder more than 12,000 souls… Unspeakably shameful acts were done to five-year-old girls by Persians. We have collected from Moslem villages more than 100 women who have been changed to Mahomedans and their husbands murdered in their sight.
(Letter from the Rev. Gabriel Alexander, dated 6 August 1915, published in The Times, 9 October 1915 2)

Greek Genocide

Ottoman Greeks have been described as the “first victims of the nationalising idea.”3 They lived in Anatolia, especially near the Black Sea. In 1914 plans were made to relocate them to Greece in exchange for Muslims from the Balkans. The outbreak of World War One prevented this so, instead, communities were forced on death marches to central Anatolia under the guise of strategic military manoeuvring or made to perform manual labour. Muslim boycotts of Greek businesses were authorised by officials, and Christian properties were given to Muslims. An Australian newspaper reported:

Several Greeks at Marsivan were compelled to dig a trench as a grave before they were shot. Greek women were given the alternatives of embracing the Islam religion or death. They refused to change their religion. Their lives were spared, but they were left to the mercy of the soldiers and compelled to accompany the troops on a long march. Some fell exhausted, and were abandoned with their babies. (Published in The Argus, Melbourne, 3 August 1915 4)

Unlike most men, women and children were often given the option of converting to Islam. Those that refused were treated very harshly or killed.

Aftermath

Turkey continued to rid itself of all Christians. Thousands of Ottoman Greeks died and more fled as Turkish armies sought reprisals on Christian populations following Greece’s failed invasion, 1919-1922. Armenians continued to be massacred, deported, or forced to flee, even after the Republic of Armenia was established in May 1918. Protection came when the Red Army brought Armenia under Soviet control in 1920. The Armenian diaspora exists all around the world today.

Assyrians were expelled and forced to live in refugee camps in the southern Caucasus, though some women and children remained as slaves. They were to experience further massacres just ten years later in Iraq.

The psychological impact and immense suffering of these peoples, who so nearly came to complete destruction, continues today. This year 2015 marks the 100th anniversary of the single worst year of the genocide. Armenians remember especially 24 April 1915, the day on which their intellectuals and leaders were destroyed, the day on which, they say, “our head was cut off”. Their sufferings have, for the most part, been forgotten, Turkey has never admitted responsibility, and, worst of all, the Christian presence in the Middle East is yet again in danger of eradication, this time at the hands of the Islamic State militants.

1 Ronald Grigor Suny, “Religion, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Armenians, Turks, and the End of the Ottoman Empire,” in Omer Bartov and Phyllis Mack, eds, In God’s Name: Genocide and Religion in the Twentieth Century (New York, Berghahn Books, 2001), p. 41

2 www.atour.com/history/london-times/20000803a.html (Viewed 19 Dec 2014)

3 Morgenthau, H The Murder of a Nation
(New York, Armenian General Benevolent
Union of America Inc., 1974)

4 “ARMENIAN ATROCITIES” in The Argus (Melbourne, Victoria) 3 Aug 1915: 7

FYI – On the eve of the 100th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide in Turkey, the recent fascinating book “Atatürk in the Nazi imagination” by Stefan Ihrig demonstrates the substantive and wide-ranging relationship between Kemalism and Nazism and how deeply and strongly the former influenced the development of the latter. Not to be missed! Attached are various items, including reviews of the book and an article by the book’s author, that address the issue.” PA/MM

1. Subject: Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination

Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination — Stefan Ihrig | Harvard University Press

				Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination — Stefan Ihrig | Harvard… Early in his career, Hitler took inspiration from Mussolini — this fact is widely known. But an equally important role model for Hitler has been neglected: A…
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2. Subject: RE: Nazism-Kemalism: ‘Atatürk in the Nazi imagination’ Book Review by Vicken Cheterian, Webster University, Geneva Campus, Switzerland

Atatürk in the Nazi imagination

by Stefan Ihrig,

Cambridge, HarvardUniversity Press, 2014,

320 pp., US$29.95 (hardcover), ISBN 9780674368378

In this study, Stefan Ihrig succeeded in delivering a tour de force, opening up pages of

history to challenge conventional reading of the past, and to our understanding of the connected

nature of nationalisms in the interwar period. This book proposes a major revision of

established historiography, such as Kemalist modernism and its interpretation, the rise of

nationalism in Europe in the 1920s, and sources and models of inspiration in the emergence

of Nazism in Germany.

By plunging into the German texts of the 1920s and 1930s, Ihrig tells us how Nazi

Germany read, imagined, and appropriated lessons of Kemalist Turkey. The study is

largely based on reviewing nationalist German newspaper articles of the interwar period,

as well as speeches, biographies, and diaries, to reconstruct how Nazi leadership and the

broader German public integrated the example of Turkish nationalism, to serve as an

example for Germany in crisis. Contrary to historiography of today, where Turkey under

Kemal is treated as a different category compared to Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy,

mainly for its supposed “lack” of a charismatic leader and constant mobilization of the

population, and is often brought as an example of “modernization” in the Third World

context and specifically for Muslim societies. Ihrig narrates how the “Turkish Führer” as

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was called, played a “role model” for the Nazi imagination.

Germany was closely associated with Turkey even before the war of independence led by

Atatürk. Close collaboration and admiration of Turkish examples goes back to the 1908

Young Turk revolution, and to the period of WorldWar I during which Germany was in alliance

with the Ottoman Empire, and German officers were put at the head of the Ottoman

army. Among them were many who played an important role in the emergence of the

postwar nationalist movement. Here, Enver Pasha, a Young Turk army officer who

became the Ottoman war minister during WWI, emerges as the first subject of German fascination.

Enver was also a friend and later a jealous competitor of Mustafa Kemal, an adventurer

who led an invasion of the Russian Caucasus in winter snow through the mountains of

Armenia only for the best of his fighting forces to perish in a snow storm.

In the postwar period, as the Entente imposed harsh conditions of peace on Germany in

Versailles, nationalist Turkey revolted against the conditions imposed on the Ottoman

Empire in the Treaty of Sèvres. The Nationalist Turkish movement gathered in Ankara

around the leadership of Mustafa Kemal rejected the legitimacy of the Constantinople

government that acknowledged Sèvres, fought against invading Greek forces, and

challenged British and French troops. After its military victories, the new Turkish government

in Ankara revised the peace accord in the new Lausanne Treaty, the basis of modern

Turkey.

Kemalist Turkey also imposed a personality cult of its leader (the “Turkish Führer”),

created a one-party system based on nationalist ideology, “modernized” the state and

society by eliminating the old Ottoman Caliphate, marginalized religion, and imposed a

state-sponsored national identity with its corresponding language and education policies.

Kemalist Turkey also continued the elimination or expulsion of non-Muslim minorities,

mainly Armenians, Assyrians, and Greeks.

For a defeated and frustrated Germany, and especially for Nazis, Turkey under Mustafa

Kemal became a model to follow. Nazis “grew up” following news coming from Turkey in

the period of 1919–1923, developing a monolithic discourse about it, and drawing a number

of “Turkish lessons” valid for their own situation. The central lesson was that the postwar

order, and especially the hated Peace Treaty could be challenged. The Turkish “War of

Independence” was intensely reported by the German press, to a degree that it became a

“German topic.” The passivity of Germany’s post-WWI position was contrasted

with Turkish “active politics,” where choosing to fight rather than to surrender to “pacifism”

honor was conquered. The “Führer model” of the German nationalist media found an

example to illustrate in the case of Atatürk: voluntary, determined, heroic, and militaristic,

capable of changing the circumstances around rather than surrendering to them. Nationalist

Turkey also showed the example – in the Nazi reading – that the national will can be

victorious not only in internal struggles (as Italian Fascism demonstrated) but also could

challenge external forces, foreign imperial forces.

Here, traditional roles between European power and a semi-colonial Ottoman east were

turned upside-down, whereby it was Germany being presented as the “sick man of Europe”

while Turkey was becoming the “role model” for Germany to emulate. German nationalist

reports on Kemalist Turkey were silent on, or minimized the role of Islam in Kemalism, or

its alliance with Bolshevik Russia, from which it received material and military support

necessary for its war of independence. Like Kemalist Turkey, nationalist German papers

developed an “anti-imperialist” discourse, opposing it with a nationalist one.

The author argues that the “Hitlerputsch” of November 1923, also known as “Munich

Putsch” or “Beer Hall Putsch,” was inspired largely by the “Turkish model” rather than by

Mussolini’s March on Rome, as often repeated in history manuals. The “Ankara solution”

became a stereotype in the media, suggesting a nationalist revolt against Berlin and its concessions.

By analyzing the writings before the putsch, as well as Hitler’s final speech during

the trial that ensued, the author argues that Ankara was a stronger metaphor in the Nazi

imagination than the Mussolini case. During the years when the Nazis were repressed

and on the defensive, the “happy ending” (158) in the case of the Turkish struggle

served as a source of inspiration to the German far right. While the debate about Turkey

and Atatürk specifically declined after the failed putsch, a cult of the “Turkish Führer”

was established after 1933.

Nazi Germany nevertheless had problems with the Turks, as it was not obvious how to

categorize them according to Nazi racial preferences. Eventually, it was decided: “The

Turks Are Aryans!” (128) German nationalists read Turkish history in the way they

wanted to: they were selective. They saw in Atatürk’s biography firmness, and devotion

to the Führer principle, yet they disregarded an article authored by Mustafa Kemal

himself and published in 1938 in Hamburger Tageblatt, advising for the welfare of the

nation rather than pursuing the idea of building a great empire and igniting military adventures

abroad.

German Nazis considered Kemalist Turkey as the most modern of states for its ideological

dimension: to establish a “racially homogenous state” by destroying the minorities,

namely the Armenians and the Greeks. Here too it is the Turkish example that is closer

to the Nazi imagination, rather than Mussolini’s Fascism. The destruction of the “lesser

races” (154) served as an inspiration and a model for the Nazis. Hans Tröbst, a nationalist

journalist who had been to Turkey during the war, wrote in 1924 “what had happened to the

Armenians might very well happen to the Jews in a future Germany.” (179). The intense

debates among Nazi dignitaries about Turkish nationalism, and its elimination of Christian

populations, “warrant a reevaluation of the role of the Armenian Genocide in the genesis of

the Holocaust” affirms Ihrig, proposing yet another enormous historiographical debate that

needs to be engaged in.

Vicken Cheterian

Webster University, GenevaCampus, Switzerland

cheterian

© 2015, Vicken Cheterian

3. Hitler’s Infatuation with Atatürk Revisited

By Halil Karaveli (vol. 8, no. 1 of the Turkey Analyst)

Atatürk was Hitler’s “shining star in the darkness.” The Third Reich instituted a veritable cult of Atatürk. The Nazi admiration provides a lens for a fresh look at Kemalism. In spite of its pretentions to stand for “enlightenment”, Kemalism has failed to midwife a democratic evolution. The question is whether this has anything to do with the aspects of Kemalism that the Nazis admired.

BACKGROUND: The belief that the achievements of Kemal Atatürk inspired “the cause of the East,” that his success encouraged others in the Middle East, Asia and Africa to resist Western imperialism and to embark on the path to secularist modernization has been a central tenet of the Kemalist discourse. In fact, there is little, if any substance to the claims that Atatürk ever had such outsized world historical significance.

Turkey’s “father” did serve as an inspiration for his contemporary, the autocratic modernizer Reza Shah of Persia. Habib Bourgiba, Tunisia’s first president took some inspiration from him. Tracing the lineages of the secular Baath dictators Hafez al-Assad and Saddam Hussein back to Kemalism, as some have done, is much more questionable. In any case, Kemalism may have mattered more for the course of history in the Middle East as a provocation rather than as an inspiration.

Atatürk’s secularist radicalism, and especially his abolishment of the caliphate in 1924, played a not insignificant role in whipping up an Islamic reaction against Western influences in places like British held India and Egypt; it was partly in reaction to what had happened in Kemalist Turkey that Hassan al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928.

No corresponding attention has been paid to Atatürk’s possible impact on European history. The pull that European Fascism and Nazism exerted on the Kemalist regime during the 1930’s has only to some extent been explored, and then with the assumption that there were no influences going in the other direction. New research turns this reading of history on its head.

Stefan Ihrig, Polonsky Fellow at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, has undertaken a “journey into a historiographic void.” What he has unearthed moves Atatürk into European history. The recently published Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press), chronicles how the German National Socialists developed an infatuation with Mustafa Kemal early on, from the moment when he rebelled against the Ottoman sultan and against the peace treaty that had been imposed on the Ottoman state after the First World War.

Atatürk’s revolution fascinated the German nationalists and far right in the early Weimar years like no other international topic. Newspapers repeatedly called for the application of “Turkish lessons” to Germany. The National Socialists “were strongly motivated by the Turkish War of Independence in their endeavors to “liberate” Germany,” writes Ihrig. In his defense speech in 1924, when Hitler stood trial for his failed putsch in Munich the year before, he legitimized his action by referring to Mustafa Kemal’s assumption of power in Ankara in 1920; Hitler stated that Mustafa Kemal had carried out the most perfect of the two revolutions, the other being Mussolini’s in 1922.

IMPLICATIONS: The Nazis “grew up” with Kemalism, as Ihrig puts it, and their infatuation with Atatürk never abated, on the contrary. The Third Reich instituted a veritable cult of Atatürk. In no other country were as many books on “The Turkish Führer”– as he was most often simply referred to as – published as in interwar Germany. Ihrig concludes that probably only Fascist Italy can compete with the overwhelming coverage and ideological importance of the New Turkey for Nazi Germany. The Nazis genuinely believed that Kemalist Turkey was “one of us.” As they saw it, “the victorious success of the Turkish project in itself was proof of the viability of both the Führer principle and the one party state concept.”

In 1938, Hitler stated that “Atatürk was the first to show that it is possible to mobilize and regenerate the resources that a country has lost. In this respect Atatürk was a teacher; Mussolini was his first and I his second student.” In 1933, the main Nazi daily Völkischer Beobachter reported that Hitler had affirmed that “the successful struggle for liberation that the Ghazi (Atatürk) led in order to create Turkey had given him the confidence that the National Socialist movement would be successful as well. In this respect the movement of Turkey had been a shining star for him.” Joseph Goebbels recorded in his diary that Atatürk’s death “would be an irreplaceable loss.”

Atatürk’s Turkey was celebrated as the first non-communist one party state. In 1931, Mussolini agreed with the judgment that “among all the postwar dictatorships“, Mustafa Kemal’s regime was the “most successful one.” In 1942 Hitler, discussing the future of Romanian dictator Ion Antonescu, pointed out that he had to follow the example of Atatürk lest he would be lost; “Atatürk has secured his power through his People’s Party. It is similar in Italy.” What is also telling is that in this quote, Hitler, as he always did, mentioned Atatürk first, and then Mussolini. Ihrig’s book establishes that in the minds of the Nazis and the Italian Fascists, the three new systems – National Socialism, Italian Fascism and Kemalism – “were engaged in an ongoing dialogue throughout their existence.”

Leading representatives of the Kemalist regime, notably party secretary Recep Peker, did indeed engage in such a dialogue with Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. Peker visited Berlin and Rome and expressed open admiration for Fascism and Nazism. However, there is nothing that suggests that Atatürk personally held Hitler and Mussolini in high regard, on the contrary.

The way Turkey was perceived by the Nazis offers new insights into the Nazis’ worldview and their self-image. Ihrig can show that Hitler admired Atatürk also for his resolve in his fight against “the church.” In 1942, Hitler remarked that “How fast Kemal Atatürk dealt with the priests is one of the most amazing chapters of history!” In this regard, Turkey was superior to Italy as role model. Hitler exhorted Italy, together with Franco’s Spain, to break the power of the Catholic Church, thus to follow the Turkish example in dealing with the priests, “the cancer of politics,” as Hitler called them.

In contrast, Ihrig does not dwell much on what Hitler’s infatuation with Atatürk says about his New Turkey, as the Nazis called it; he holds that the Nazis saw what they wanted to see, and that the “ambiguity” of Kemalism allowed it to “accommodate” such perceptions. However, what does become clear is that the Nazis had a clear-eyed appreciation of the key to Atatürk’s success.

Ihrig emphasizes that the question of race – specifically the question of national minorities and their “cleansing”- was central to the Nazi vision of Atatürk’s success. “Part and parcel of this völkisch success story was always the “cleansing” of the new state of any minorities, of anything foreign. The “fact” that the New Turkey was a real and pure völkisch state, because no more Greeks or Armenians were left in Anatolia, was stressed time and again, in hundreds of articles, texts and speeches. The “pure national” existence of the New Turkey was crucial for everything that had happened in Anatolia in the 1920’s and 1930’s.”

Ihrig notes that the source (and veracity) of Hitler’s alleged exclamation, “Who, after all, speaks today of the annihilation of the Armenians?” remains disputed; but even so, “for the Nazis the murder of the Ottoman Armenians was one of the main foundations of this vibrant new völkisch state.”

Ihrig speculates that the extermination of the Armenians “must have exerted” a “paramount influence” on the Nazis. Thomas Weber of the University of Aberdeen ventures that Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination “will change how we think about German and European history as well as the Holocaust.” In a similar vein, the Nazi admiration provides a lens for a fresh look at Kemalism.

In spite of its pretentions to stand for “enlightenment”, Kemalism has failed to midwife a democratic evolution; the question is whether this has anything to do with the aspects of Kemalism that the Nazis admired.

CONCLUSIONS: There is obviously no simple answer to why democracy has continued to elude Turkey. But the failure may have been genetically inscribed at the “foundation” that the Nazis identified and celebrated. This “foundation” – the “cleansing” of Anatolia’s Christians — did not in fact secure the “pure national” existence that Kemalists and Nazis alike celebrated, as the resistance of the Kurds to the Kemalist project has demonstrated. But it did amount to the obliteration of civil society. It ensured the lasting omnipotence of the state, the full control of the state over society, another aspect of the New Turkey that the Nazis also admired.

The Christians constituted most of the bourgeoisie; their removal meant that the class dynamics that normally would have resulted in ushering in liberalization were distorted. Indeed, the policies of ethnic cleansing that the regime of the Committee of Union and Progress undertook during the final years of the Ottoman state were precisely motivated by the determination of the Muslim Turkish state elite to ensure that society remained subservient to the state as had always been the case in the Ottoman realm. The increasing clout of the rising bourgeoisie inspired fear; the state elite realized that it would have inevitably checked the power of the state bureaucracy, paving for the development of civil society, and to a liberal political evolution.

The foundation of the lasting power of the Turkish state was laid with the ethnic cleansing of Anatolia. The Kemalist regime distributed the properties of the exterminated, authentic bourgeoisie, and created a new, artificial bourgeoisie that owed its existence to the state. This genesis established an asymmetrical state-bourgeoisie relationship that has endured; the bourgeoisie has remained beholden and subservient to the state. Like the Kemalists before them, the Islamists in power today have created their own class of businessmen that depend on the state and who serve as the main class basis of the regime. With its bourgeois democratic revolution seemingly forever postponed, Turkey remains a statist “success story.”

Halil M. Karaveli is Senior Fellow and Editor of the Turkey Analyst, at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center.

(Image Attribution: Wikimedia Commons)

Read 1 times Last modified on Tuesday, 20 January 2015

4. Subject: The Nazi glorification of Ataturk: Ankara’s shining star

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/dec/30/book-review-ataturk-in-the-nazi-imagination/

5. Subject: Erdogan’s New Turkey: Goodbye Atatürk, Hello Atatürk | Stefan Ihrig

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stefan-ihrig/erdogan-new-turkey-ataturk_b_6831206.html