Για μία ακόμα φορά αποκαλύπτεται το αληθινό πρόσωπο των δήθεν προασπιστών των ανθρωπίνων δικαιωμάτων, των δήθεν υπερασπιστών της δημοκρατίας και της παγκόσμιας ειρήνης.
Εν προκειμένω, η πάντα φιλεύσπλαχνη Αμερική πίεσε τη Δανία να «φιμώσει» την αγωνιώδη φωνή του κουρδικού λαού, ο οποίος αγωνίζεται για την επιβίωσή του, προκειμένου να ικανοποιήσει την πάντα πρόθυμη να υπακούσει τις σκοτεινές εντολές της Τουρκία.
Ειδικότερα, το 2009, η Δανία φέρεται να συμφώνησε να ξεκινήσει νομική δράση για το κλείσιμο του Roj TV, του κουρδικού καναλιού που εξέπεμπε από την Κοπεγχάγη, προκειμένου να κατευνάσει την Τουρκία.
Σε αντάλλαγμα, η Άγκυρα συμφώνησε να στηρίξει τον Rasmussen ως επικεφαλής του ΝΑΤΟ.
Οι μυστικές αυτές συμφωνίες αποκαλύπτονται στα απόρρητα τηλεγραφήματα των αμερικανικών πρεσβειών στην Κοπεγχάγη και την Άγκυρα που διέρρευσαν μέσω της Wikileaks.
Οι Αμερικανοί διπλωμάτες φέρεται να έχουν συνεχή επικοινωνία με τις δύο πλευρές, πιέζοντας μάλιστα τη Δανία να επιταχύνει τις διαδικασίες.
Στις εγκλίσεις τους, η Δανία διαμαρτύρονταν επανειλημμένα ότι η Τουρκία δεν της παρέχει το απαραίτητο υλικό για να συνεχίσει τη νομική διαδικασία και επέρριπτε την ευθύνη στους Τούρκους που δεν κατανοούν πλήρως το νομικό σύστημα της Δανίας.
Ωστόσο, όλα έγιναν όπως συμφωνήθηκαν. Ο Ράσμουσεν εξελέγη γγ του ΝΑΤΟ το 2009 με τη σύμφωνη γνώμη της Τουρκίας και το 2013 το κουρδικό κανάλι έχασε οριστικά την άδεια εκπομπής, με την κατηγορία της προώθησης της τρομοκρατίας.
Classified By: POL Counselor Daniel O’Grady. Reasons: 1.4 (b,d).
1. (C) Summary. Turkey’s March 9 response to a long-standing
Danish request for concrete, «actionable» information on the
link between PKK and ROJ-TV was inadequate, Danish Ambassador
Vahr complained to us March 11. Turkey has not yet responded
to Denmark’s December proposal of formal bilateral
counterterrorism (CT) «action plan.» Vahr wonders whether
Ankara’s slowness in responding to Danish requests could be
intentional, to keep Denmark as a convenient whipping boy,
and fears closure of the current window of opportunity to
engage high-level Danish law enforcement officials. We agree
that another roundtable bringing Turkish and Danish legal
experts together to examine actual cases could help bridge
the communication gap. End summary.
ROJ-TV: The Thorn in the Side
2. (C) Danish Ambassador Jesper Vahr described to us March 11
recent Danish counterterrorism (CT) cooperation with Turkey,
including Danish efforts to address the ROJ-TV issue. Turkey
asserts ROJ-TV is affiliated with and supports the PKK (KGK),
but it has not been able to provide Danish authorities with
concrete evidence of the tie between the two that would hold
up in a court of law, Vahr stated. Denmark’s inability to
find legal mechanisms to shut-down Kurdish-language
broadcasts from Denmark by ROJ-TV remains the major issue in
the bilateral relationship and the one which occupies more of
his time than any other, Vahr stated.
3. (C) Six months after Denmark’s formal request for more
concrete information to support Turkey’s allegations that
ROJ-TV is linked to the PKK (and over 10 months after its
initial informal request), Turkey’s Ministry of Justice on
March 9 finally provided an 11-page document purporting to
document the connection. Clearly frustrated, Vahr complained
the Turks response was still inadequate; the information
provided would not hold up in a court of law. Despite
several sessions between Turkish and Danish experts, Turkey
still does not seem to «get it.» Turkey continues to focus
primarily on ROJ-TV messages, whereas Denmark had explained
it needs to be able to demonstrate that ROJ-TV is either
laundering money that ends up at foundations clearly
affiliated with the PKK or that it has an institutional link
with the terrorist group. Vahr hoped for an opportunity for
Turkish and European legal experts to go over actual cases,
as suggested at the June 2008 roundtable for Turkish and
European prosecutors (Ref a).
4. (S) Vahr reviewed Danish efforts to demonstrate its
good-faith to strengthen bilateral CT cooperation. These
included Danish assistance in investigating a 2006 bombing on
Turkey’s southern coast with links to Denmark; provision of
passenger name lists for Copenhagen-Erbil flights involving
Kurdish cash couriers; September 2007 VIP security detail
training of Turkish National Police; an April 2008 visit to
Turkey by Danish State Prosecutors Office and Copenhagen
police officials directly involved with the ROJ-TV case;
January 2009 assistance to Turkey’s new witness protection
system; and ongoing cooperation on al Qaeda plots in Denmark
with links to Turkey. Noting that Turkey is in the midst of
restructuring its CT mechanisms, Vahr said he had recently
offered Interior Minister Atalay to share Denmark’s
experience establishing a counterterrorism analysis center
two years ago. The Minister was very interested, Vahr
5. (C) Denmark had also become more forthcoming on formal CT
cooperation, Amb. Vahr stated. When Turkey first proposed a
bilateral CT agreement in December 2007, during inaugural CT
consultations, Denmark was reluctant to sign a «stand alone»
agreement, proposing an MOU instead (Ref b). In December
2008, however, Denmark presented a draft bilateral CT «Action
Plan.» MFA Undersecretary Tezcan would be the likely
negotiator on the Turkish side, Vahr opined. To Vahr’s
frustration, however, Ankara has not yet responded to the
6. (C) Vahr speculated aloud whether Turkey’s slowness in
responding to Denmark’s requests, and the thinness of the
material provided, might be part of a deliberate effort to
drag out the ROJ-TV matter, thus retaining Denmark as a
«whipping boy» to be produced and criticized when politically
expedient. As an example, he pointed to a critical letter
sent by PM Erdogan to Danish PM Rasmussen following the
October 2008 PKK attack on a Turkish military outpost in
which 15 soldiers were reported killed. He also wondered how
the ROJ-TV issue would affect Turkey’s attitude toward the
NATO Secretary General candidacy of Danish PM Rasmussen.
Vahr was anxious to persuade the Turks to move more quickly
and to maintain the momentum in CT relations begun with the
December 2007 CT consultations and bolstered by the April
2008 Chief Prosecutor’s visit. MFA U/S Apakan had visited
Copenhagen February 24 and of course raised ROJ-TV. Now,
Vahr stressed, the two sides had a window of opportunity,
with high-level Danish interest among law enforcement
authorities. He feared Danish interest would wane if Turkey
is not more forthcoming with concrete information. Denmark
has pressing competing priorities, including a growing
domestic gang war. He understood that Turkey had been able
to provide the UK with the information needed to close
PKK-affiliated MED-TV in London in 1999 and did not
understand why they could not do the same for ROJ-TV.
7. (C) ROJ-TV continues to dominate Denmark-Turkey
relations. While we understand Danish frustration, Turkey’s
«thin» responses may be a matter of inadequate understanding
of Danish legal requirements rather than of deliberately
dragging the issue out. We agree that providing Turkish and
European prosecutors and other legal experts the opportunity
to go over actual cases could prove to be a valuable
mechanism for bridging the gaps in understanding. S/CT PDAS
Schlicher’s upcoming visit to Ankara, Copenhagen and other
European capitals could also help facilitate closer
cooperation against the PKK and other terrorist groups.
Classified By: Charge d’Affaires a.i. Terence McCulley, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S) In recent discussions, Danish government officials and the chief prosecutor in the case against PKK-affiliated Roj-TV underscored their determination to address that case according to Danish law, expressing frustration with the evidence produced so far and unwilling to predict when the station may be taken to court. Danish pledges to intensify efforts against Roj-TV — among the measures offered Turkey for not blocking former PM Rasmussen’s appointment as NATO secretary general — have given additional impetus to the investigation while also prompting senior officials to tread carefully, to avoid the appearance of a quid pro quo (i.e., sacrificing freedom of speech in exchange for a high-level post). The Danes report, however, that they are pursuing «new angles» to the case and would welcome the opportunity to discuss them in greater detail with the anticipated U.S. counterterrorism delegation (among these «new angles» may be information developed through an informant and alternative approaches on broadcasting content and tax evasion). Denmark: No Interference with Judicial Process ——————————————— –
2. (S) Shortly after the NATO Strasbourg Summit at which Rasmussen secured his new post over Turkish objections, PM National Security Advisor Thomas Ahrenkiel emphasized to us the importance of resolving the Roj-TV issue through legal and intelligence channels. Ahrenkiel, who has stayed on as NSA to the new prime minister, signaled that his office wanted to avoid any suggestion of undue political pressure in the matter, and encouraged us to work directly with the chief prosecutor, Lise-Lotte Nilas. When pressed a few weeks later by visiting U.S. Ambassador to NATO Kurt Volker (reftel), Ahrenkiel acknowledged that he had not been keeping his Turkish counterpart informed about the case, but (reluctantly, it seemed) agreed to do so in light of growing Turkish concerns. The PM’s office and the MFA remain wary of raising their profile on Roj-TV, concerned about the domestic political fallout and potential damage to the case itself. Stymied on Content, Still Looking for PKK Links ——————————————— –
3. (C) Prosecutor Nilas and Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) Legal Advisor Lykke Sorensen reviewed for us the status of the Roj-TV investigation May 20, highlighting the case’s long history and ongoing challenges. The initial focus, they recalled, had been to investigate Turkish complaints based on Roj-TV’s broadcasting content. Twice the Danish Radio and Television Board has ruled on the matter, concluding — after reviewing television footage provided by Turkish authorities — that Roj-TV’s programming did not incite hatred, violence or otherwise corrupt minors, as alleged by Turkey. Rather, the Danish board ruled, most recently in May 2007, that Roj-TV’s broadcasts resemble those of other news organizations covering violence and terrorist acts. Sorensen noted that, otherwise, sanctions could be similarly applied to any news outlet that covered, for example, terrorist bombings in Iraq or news of the latest al-Qaeda statement. Nilas noted that the recent German court decision suspending the ban on Roj-TV there made it that much more difficult to argue against the station on content.
4. (S) Denmark’s criminal investigation of Roj-TV has focused, meanwhile, on establishing institutional links between the station and the PKK, especially on the financial side. Despite the Danish police’s and tax authorities” own efforts, intelligence provided by the Turks and us, interdictions of suspected couriers and stepped-up cooperation with EU partners (Nilas mentioned the Belgians, Germans and French through EUROJUST), no clear evidence has been found to connect the broadcaster with the PKK. Roj-TV has learned to be very careful over the years, evincing an open and cooperative attitude toward occasional — and fruitless — reviews of their books. Sorensen noted that Danish authorities aren’t even certain which way the money flows are supposed to be going — is Roj-TV financing the PKK, or is it the other way around? Communication with Turks Improving, but Expectations Differ ——————————————— ————–
5. (C) The Danes suggest that progress in the Roj-TV case has been hampered by conceptual differences with the Turks (e.g., misunderstandings about what constitutes protected speech, legal restraints on government action) and by what the Danes perceive as lack of communication among Turkish officials. Nilas reported that her discussions in April had been positive, and she felt that she had made progress in explaining to the Turks what specific evidence is needed to advance the case in Denmark. For successful prosecution in Denmark, the state needs to show actual incitement to acts of terror, and not simply news or editorializing, she explained. Sorensen reported that the Danes continue to work directly and through their liaison officer in Ankara to break through the stovepiping in Turkish law enforcement, but communication remains a challenge.
6. (C) We see that the Danes and the Turks are sometimes talking past each other, or at least speaking based on greatly differing expectations. Senior Danish officials seemed caught by surprise last month when we told them that the Turks felt let down by Denmark’s post-Strasbourg actions; former PM Rasmussen even suggested that he and Turkish PM Erdogan had put the issue entirely behind them. Similarly, Prosecutor Nilas could not be optimistic about taking Roj-TV to court, refusing to speculate on a time frame, while the Turkish embassy here told us they were «certain» that prosecution would begin within months — supposedly based on their discussions with Nilas and the police. «New Angles,» Warm Welcome for U.S. Team —————————————-
7. (S) Nilas and Sorensen told us that the Danish authorities are looking at «new angles» in the investigation and would be ready to discuss these in more detail if and when another U.S. interagency team visits Copenhagen, ideally sooner rather than later. Sorensen suggested that she preferred to limit these «new angles» to intelligence channels for the time being, but she may have been referring to an informant the police are supposedly working with, about which we have heard some vague reports. Sorensen suggested that the Danish government may make another run at Roj-TV on tax issues, both in terms of possible evasion of payments and terror finance.
8. (S) Sorensen brought up another avenue that has not yet been explored, and that is to demonstrate that the broadcaster is consistently one-sided in its presentation of information. Though not a criminal offense, such a finding by the Danish Radio and TV Board could result in revocation of the station’s license. Sorensen did not elaborate on how this might be established or whether it has ever been done before.
9. (S) Nilas and Sorensen were enthusiastic about a possible visit by U.S. counterterrorism officials, indicating that they are eager to discuss strategy and review efforts to improve coordination with Turkey. Both recognized that new, «smoking-gun» information on Roj-TV’s PKK connections was unlikely, but they said they would be grateful — as always — for any U.S. intelligence that could help the prosecution. Comment ——-
10. (S) We are convinced that the Danes would welcome an opportunity to take action against Roj-TV and rid themselves of this issue once and for all. We are equally certain, however, that they will not move without some new evidence or approach that can shield them against charges of trading principle for the former prime minister’s career. Danish officials are committed to reinvigorated efforts to close the station, to renewed trilateral cooperation with us and the Turks, but in strict accordance with Danish law. Rasmussen and his former government maintain that President Obama personally indicated understanding for this position at Strasbourg, acknowledging the high political costs of an abrupt, unjustified reversal. We recommend that we — beginning with the upcoming visit of the S/CT-led delegation to Copenhagen — engage the Danes early to review possible new lines of approach and encourage them to think creatively about ways to disrupt or close the station, should criminal prosecution prove unachievable in the short term.