Σύμφωνα με τους Financial Times,Η γερμανική κυβέρνηση θέλει η Ελλάδα, να εκχωρήσει την εθνική κυριαρχία του προϋπολογισμού και των δαπανών στην ευρωζώνη…
σε “Επίτροπο προϋπολογισμού”, για να εξασφαλίσει την δεύτερη δανειοδότηση των 130 δις € , σύμφωνα με αντίγραφο της πρότασης που παραθέτουν οι Financial Times.
Διαβάστε τι λέει σε γενικές γραμμές το “πιστοποιητικό συμμόρφωσης”:
Η δημοσιονομική εξυγίανση πρέπει να τεθεί κάτω από ένα αυστηρό σύστημα διεύθυνσης και ελέγχου. Με δεδομένη την απογοητευτική συμμόρφωση μέχρι στιγμής, η Ελλάδα πρέπει να αποδεχθεί την μεταφορά της δημοσιονομικής κυριαρχία σε ευρωπαϊκό επίπεδο για ένα ορισμένο χρονικό διάστημα. Ένας Επίτροπος προϋπολογισμού πρέπει να διορίζεται από το Eurogroup με καθήκον να διασφαλίζει τον έλεγχο του προϋπολογισμού. Πρέπει να έχει την εξουσία α) την εφαρμογή ενός κεντρικού συστήματος αναφοράς και παρακολούθησης που θα καλύπτει όλα τα μεγάλα μπλοκ των δαπανών στον ελληνικό προϋπολογισμό, β) να σταματήσει αποφάσεις που δεν είναι σύμφωνες με τους δημοσιονομικούς στόχους που έθεσε η τρόικα και γ) είναι υπεύθυνος να διασφαλίσει συμμόρφωση με τους παραπάνω κανόνες για να δοθεί προτεραιότητα εξυπηρέτησης του χρέους.Η νέα επιτήρηση και θεσμική προσέγγιση θα πρέπει να διατυπωθεί στο μνημόνιο συμφωνίας (MOU) ως εξής: «Σε περίπτωση μη συμμόρφωσης, επιβεβαιωμένης από την ΕΚΤ, το ΔΝΤ και την ΕΕ, ένα νέος επίτροπος προϋπολογισμό διορίζεται από το Eurogroup να βοηθήσει την εφαρμογή των μεταρρυθμίσεων. Ο Επίτροπος θα έχει ευρείες αρμοδιότητες εποπτείας των δημόσιων δαπανών και το δικαίωμα άσκησης βέτο κατά αποφάσεων του προϋπολογισμού δεν συνάδουν με το σύνολο των δημοσιονομικών στόχων και της προτεραιότητας εξυπηρέτησης του χρέους. “Η Ελλάδα πρέπει να εξασφαλίσει ότι ο νέος μηχανισμός επιτήρησης είναι πλήρως ενσωματωμένος στην εθνική νομοθεσία , κατά προτίμηση μέσω συνταγματικής τροποποίησης.”
Διαβάστε ολόκληρο το πιστοποιητικό συμμόρφωσης:
Assurance of Compliance in the 2nd GRC Programme
I. Background
According to information from the Troika, Greece has most likely missed key programme objectives again in 2011. In particular, the budget deficit has not decreased compared to the previous year. Therefore Greece will have to significantly improve programme compliance in the future to honour its commitments to lenders. Otherwise the Eurozone will not be able to approve guarantees for GRC II.
II. Proposal for the improvement of compliance
To improve compliance in the 2nd programme, the new MoU will have to contain two innovative institutional elements on which Greece will have to commit itself. They will become further prior actions for the second programme. Only if and when they are implemented, the new programme can commence:
1. Absolute priority to debt service
Greece has to legally commit itself to giving absolute priority to future debt service. This commitment has to be legally enshrined by the Greek Parliament. State revenues are to be used first and foremost for debt service, only any remaining revenue may be used to finance primary expenditure. This will reassure public and private creditors that the Hellenic Republic will honour its comittments after PSI and will positively influence market access. De facto elimination of the possibility of a default would make the threat of a non-disbursement of a GRC II tranche much more credible. If a future tranche is not disbursed, Greece can not threaten its lenders with a default, but will instead have to accept further cuts in primary expenditures as the only possible consequence of any non-disbursement.
2. Transfer of national budgetary sovereignty
Budget consolidation has to be put under a strict steering and control system. Given the disappointing compliance so far, Greece has to accept shifting budgetary sovereignty to the European level for a certain period of time. A budget commissioner has to be appointed by the Eurogroup with the task of ensuring budgetary control. He must have the power a) to implement a centralized reporting and surveillance system covering all major blocks of expenditure in the Greek budget, b) to veto decisions not in line with the budgetary targets set by the Troika and c) will be tasked to ensure compliance with the above mentioned rule to prioritize debt service.
The new surveillance and institutional approach should be formulated in the MoU as follows: “In the case of non-compliance, confirmed by the ECB, IMF and EU COM, a new budget commissioner appointed by the Eurogroup would help implementing reforms. The commissioner will have broad surveillance competences over public expenditure and a veto right against budget decisions not in line with the set budgetary targets and the rule giving priority to debt service.” Greece has to ensure that the new surveillance mechanism is fully enshrined in national law, preferably through constitutional amendment”
I. Background
According to information from the Troika, Greece has most likely missed key programme objectives again in 2011. In particular, the budget deficit has not decreased compared to the previous year. Therefore Greece will have to significantly improve programme compliance in the future to honour its commitments to lenders. Otherwise the Eurozone will not be able to approve guarantees for GRC II.
II. Proposal for the improvement of compliance
To improve compliance in the 2nd programme, the new MoU will have to contain two innovative institutional elements on which Greece will have to commit itself. They will become further prior actions for the second programme. Only if and when they are implemented, the new programme can commence:
1. Absolute priority to debt service
Greece has to legally commit itself to giving absolute priority to future debt service. This commitment has to be legally enshrined by the Greek Parliament. State revenues are to be used first and foremost for debt service, only any remaining revenue may be used to finance primary expenditure. This will reassure public and private creditors that the Hellenic Republic will honour its comittments after PSI and will positively influence market access. De facto elimination of the possibility of a default would make the threat of a non-disbursement of a GRC II tranche much more credible. If a future tranche is not disbursed, Greece can not threaten its lenders with a default, but will instead have to accept further cuts in primary expenditures as the only possible consequence of any non-disbursement.
2. Transfer of national budgetary sovereignty
Budget consolidation has to be put under a strict steering and control system. Given the disappointing compliance so far, Greece has to accept shifting budgetary sovereignty to the European level for a certain period of time. A budget commissioner has to be appointed by the Eurogroup with the task of ensuring budgetary control. He must have the power a) to implement a centralized reporting and surveillance system covering all major blocks of expenditure in the Greek budget, b) to veto decisions not in line with the budgetary targets set by the Troika and c) will be tasked to ensure compliance with the above mentioned rule to prioritize debt service.
The new surveillance and institutional approach should be formulated in the MoU as follows: “In the case of non-compliance, confirmed by the ECB, IMF and EU COM, a new budget commissioner appointed by the Eurogroup would help implementing reforms. The commissioner will have broad surveillance competences over public expenditure and a veto right against budget decisions not in line with the set budgetary targets and the rule giving priority to debt service.” Greece has to ensure that the new surveillance mechanism is fully enshrined in national law, preferably through constitutional amendment”